COMMENT

THE NEW TRANSFER PRICING AND PENALTY
REGULATIONS: INCREASED COMPLIANCE,
INCREASED BURDENS, AND
THE SEARCH FOR A SAFE HARBOR

CHARLES F. CONNOLLY"
1. INTRODUCTION

The internationalization of the economy and the continuing
growth of multinational enterprises ("MNE")1 have increased
the use of, and focus on, transfer pricing.2 The lack of a
uniform multilateral tax structure provides incentives for
* J.D. Candidate, 1995, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A.,
1991, The Johns Hopkins University. I would like to thank Steven Rubin
and Tara Brennan for their comments and suggestions. I dedicate this
Comment to my mother and father, who have always encouraged, supported,
and inspired me.
' Multinational enterprises have been defined loosely as "groups of
associated enterprises operating across national frontiers." ORGANISATION
FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEV. COMM. ON FISCAL AFFAIRS,
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEV., TRANSFER PRICING
AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 7 (1979) [hereinafter 1979 OECD
REPORT]; see also ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEv.
COMM. ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEV., TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND

TAX ADMINISTRATIONS, Discussion Draft, Part I, Glossary of Terms, 94 TAX
NOTES TODAY 133-38, July 11, 1994, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library,

TNT File [hereinafter OECD Discussion Draft, Part I] (defining MNEs as
"companies with business establishments in two or more countries").
' Transfer prices are "the prices at which an enterprise transfers
physical goods and intangible property or provides services to associated
enterprises." OECD Discussion Draft, Part I, supra note 1, 11; see also
Richard L. Kaplan, International Tax Enforcement and the Special
Challenge of Transfer Pricing, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 299, 300 (defining
transfer prices as the "price at which economic goods are to be 'transferred'
within the same economic enterprise"). Although transfer pricing occurs
within domestic enterprises, most problems with the valuation of proper
profit allocation occur with MNEs. See id. at 300-01. Thus, this Comment
focuses mainly on the problem of transfer pricing as it concerns MNEs.
(339)
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MNEs to reallocate profits to jurisdictions with lower tax
rates. This growing practice greatly concerns governments
that have enacted legislation to protect their tax revenues
from the increasing number of MNEs using transfer pricing to
diminish tax liability. Thus, the central goal of transfer
pricing rules is to "allocate a reasonable amount of income
from a particular transaction to the appropriate taxpayers and
jurisdictions, having regard to their inputs into the incomeearning process."'
The United States has led the attack on inaccurate transfer
pricing.4 Despite this leadership, one senator declared that
"[t]he Federal Government is going into the 21st Century with
19th Century accounting principles."5 The U.S. government's
reported statistics on the effects of inaccurate transfer pricing
support this contention. Estimates of tax revenue losses reach
as high as $10 billion a year.' The General Accounting
Office' reported that partly because of transfer pricing,
approximately seventy-two percent of foreign-controlled
corporations and fifty-nine percent of U.S.-controlled
corporations paid no U.S. income tax between the years 1987
and 1990.' In 1992, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS")
proposed over $4 billion in transfer pricing adjustments,9 and

3 David R. Black, Splitting Profits: Findingthe Right Transfer-Pricing
Methodology, 41 CAN. TAX J. 140, 141 (1993).
4 See Brian J. Arnold & Thomas E. McDonnell, Report on the Invitational
Conference on Transfer Pricing: The Allocation of Income and Expenses
Among Countries, 61 TAX NOTES 1377, 1387 (1993); Marc M. Levey et al.,
Japan's Transfer PricingSystem is Evolving Along U.S. Lines, 4 J. INT'L
TAX'N 407, 407 (1993) [hereinafter Levey et al., Japan'sSystem].
r The Breakdown of IRS Tax Enforcement Regarding Multinational
Corporations:Revenue Losses, Excessive Litigation,and Unfair Burdensfor
U.S. Producers,HearingBefore the Senate Comm. on GovernmentalAffairs,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 IRS Tax Enforcement
Hearings](opening statement of Sen. Byron L. Dorgan).
6 See id.
The General Accounting Office is "the agency through which Congress
maintains an independent check upon the fiscal operations of the executive
departments and independent establishments of the government." Darrel
H. Smith, THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE 73 (1974).
' See 1993 IRS Tax Enforcement Hearings,supra note 5, at 45 (summary
statement of Natwar M. Ghandi, Associate Director, Tax Policy and
Administration Issues, General Government Division, U.S. General
Accounting Office).
' See id.
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as of October 1993, pending disputes of transfer pricing
adjustments involved at least $11.3 billion in tax
deficiencies.' 0 Continued growth of transfer pricing and its
concomitant taxation problems are expected. In its 1979
report, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development ("OECD") stated that "[t]his increasingly common
phenomenon of related companies operating in a group with
some degree of centralized management, yet with the
individual members of the group operating under different

national laws, has given rise to important problems regarding
the taxation of corporate profits."' Thus, in 1988, the U.S.
Treasury Department released its Study of Intercompany
Pricing,more commonly known as its White Paper," setting
forth the IRS's position on many transfer pricing issues. The
White Paper established the foundation upon which the
regulations promulgated by the IRS in 1994 ("new

10 See Nearly $10 Billion in Allocations Disputed in 87 TransferPricing
Cases, 204 Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) § G (Oct. 25, 1993), available in
LEXIS, Legis Library, DREXEC File. Although this amount represents
about one-third of the total tax deficiencies pending in the U.S. Tax Court,
transfer pricing cases account for only 0.002% of the cases pending in tax
courts. See id.
n 1979 OECD REPORT, supra note 1, at 7. The OECD currently is
revising and updating this report. On July 11, 1994, the OECD released
Part I of its Discussion Draft entitled "Transfer Pricing Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations." See OECD Discussion
Draft, Part I, supra note 1. On March 8, 1995, the OECD released Part II
of its Discussion Draft. See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION
AND DEV. COMM. ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEV., TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES AND TAx ADMINISTRATIONS, Discussion Draft, Part II, 95 TAX
NOTES TODAY, Mar. 16, 1995, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File
[hereinafter OECD Discussion Draft, Part II]. The entire report is slated for
finalization in June 1995. See John Turro, OECD Releases Part2 of Draft
Report on Transfer Pricing,95 TAx NOTES TODAY, Mar. 15, 1995, available
in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File. As the Discussion Draft has not yet
been finalized, this Comment will reference both the 1979 OECD Report and
Parts I and II of the Discussion Draft.
12 UNITED STATES TREASURY DEPARTMENT, A STUDY OF INTERCOMPANY
PRICING UNDER SECTION 482 OF THE CODE (1988), reprinted in Notice 88123, 1988-2 C.B. 458 [hereinafter WHITE PAPER]. This study was done in
response to a Congressional Conference Committee report calling for a
"comprehensive study ofintercompany pricing rules by the Internal Revenue
Service [with]... careful consideration [to] be given to whether the existing
regulations could be modified in any respect." H.R. REP. No. 841, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 638 (1986).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.

[Vol. 16:2

regulations") are based. 13
This Comment examines U.S. attempts to resolve transfer
pricing problems, particularly through an examination of the
applicable regulations. Section 2 defines the transfer pricing
problem, and Section 3 presents the different theories used to
determine when a transfer pricing adjustment should be made.
Section 4 discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the two
standards used to determine proper adjustments. Section 5
analyzes the new regulations, focusing on "the best method
rule" 4 and the standards that taxpayers must satisfy in
order to avoid imposition of an accuracy-related penalty.
Section 6 examines different categories of safe harbors 5 and

"sThe current regulations are based on the second set of regulations the
IRS proposed after release of the White Paper. The IRS first proposed
temporary regulations in 1992. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482, 57 Fed. Reg.
3571 (1992). These regulations, however, were subject to an avalanche of
criticism, and were replaced in early 1993 by a second set of regulations.
See Arnold & McDonnell, supra note 4, at 1377. One tax analyst stated that
"[t]he 1992 provisions should now be viewed as no more than a straw man
in the debate about how to improve voluntary compliance with-or the
government's effective enforcement of-the arm's length standard." Steven
P. Hannes, An Evaluation of IRS's 1993 Transfer Pricing and Related
Penalty Proposals: Round Three, 6 TAX NOTES INT'L 397, 399 (1993)

[hereinafter Hannes, Round Three]; see also Steven P. Hannes, Deloitte &
Touche Recommends Changes to Transfer PricingRegs., 93 TAX NOTES INT'L
(1993), available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TXNINT File [hereinafter
Hannes, Deloitte & Touche] (claiming that there is a sense of relief about
the repeal of some of the features in the 1992 regulations).
In response to these criticisms, the IRS promulgated a completely new
set of temporary regulations in 1993. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482 (1993).
In general, the comments regarding the 1993 temporary regulations were
much more favorable. See generally 59 Fed. Reg. 34971, 34975 (1994)
(comments on the temporary regulations). Although the final regulations
contain numerous modifications of the 1993 regulations, "both the format
and the substance of the final regulations are generally consistent with the
1993 regulations." Id. at 34975; see also George N. Carlson et al., The Final
TransferPricingRegulations: The More Things Change, the More They Stay
the Same, 94 TAX NOTES TODAY, July 29, 1994, available in LEXIS, Fedtax

Library, TNT File (stating that the "final regulations have not
fundamentally altered the guidelines established in the temporary
regulations").
14 The "best method rule" must be used under current regulations to
determine a MNE's appropriate transfer price. See infra note 80 (comparing
the new and old regulations' definitions of the best method rule) and Section
5.1.1. Briefly, the best method rule requires taxpayers to apply the transfer
pricing methodology that results in the most reliable price. See Temp.
Treas. Reg. §1.482-1(c) (as amended in 1994).
1 In the context of taxation, safe harbors generally are defined as
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol16/iss2/3
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proposes a positive safe harbor. This Comment concludes that
specific modifications of the temporary penalty regulations and
adoption of an informational positive safe harbor will best
fulfill the IRS's policy goals.
2. DEFINING THE PROBLEM

The essential problem with transfer pricing is that
transactions"6 within a MNE occur outside the influence of
the free market. 7 Because the MNE is concerned with
factors other than the free market, prices charged for such
transactions can differ from prices in similar free market
transactions." Tax considerations play an important role in
many large-scale transactions, and the MNE will establish
prices in order to limit its world-wide tax liability. 9 In
response, national taxing authorities attempt to establish the
proper level of taxable profits in order to protect their tax
revenues by adjusting transfer prices to their free market
levels.20
Any improper adjustment, however, leads to
inequitable, and potentially harmful, results.' If the taxing
"statutory provision[s] that appl[y] to a given category of taxpayers and that
relieve[] eligible taxpayers from certain obligations otherwise imposed by
the tax code by substituting exceptional, usually simpler obligations."
OECD Discussion Draft, Part II, supra note 11, 1 205.
1"These

transactions include "sales of goods, provision of services,

licensing of patents and know-how, [and] granting of loans." 1979 OECD
REPORT, supra note 1, at 7; see Kaplan, supra note 2, at 300.
17 See 1979 OECD REPORT, supra note 1, at 7; Kaplan, supra note 2, at
300.
'sSee 1979 OECD REPORT, supra note 1, at 7.
19 How large a role tax considerations play, however, is open to question.
A former International IRS Associate Chief Counsel stated that he was
convinced "that transfer prices, in most of these in-bound cases, don't get set
for tax reasons. They are set because of the political and operational
tensions within the company that have nothing to do with tax." Roundtable
Discussionon InternationalTaxation with D. Kevin Dolan, Stephen E. Shay,
and David R. Tillinghast, 61 TAx NOTES 1119, 1119-20 (1993) [hereinafter
Roundtable Discussion].
o See Arnold & McDonnell, supra note 4, at 1379.
2 This is an inevitable result of the structure of a MNE. As the OECD
noted:
[When a taxpayer under examination in one country is a member
of a[] MNE group, it is possible that the domestic tax compliance
rules will be consequential in other tax jurisdictions. This may be
particularly the case when cross-border transfer pricing issues are
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authority overestimates the taxable profits, the MNE may be
subject to double taxation.2 2
Moreover, double taxation
"constitutes a potential barrier to the development of
international trade and investment flows."2 ' Conversely, if
the taxing authority underestimates taxable profits, the
country will lose valuable tax revenue. A simple hypothetical

will illustrate.
A U.S.-based corporation, Parentco, produces widgets at a
cost of $5. In a free market, Parentco could sell these widgets
directly for $30, which would create taxable profit of $25.
Parentco, however, sells the widgets to one of its subsidiaries,
Subco, wholly located in Country Y, for $10. Subco then sells
the widgets at the free market price of $30. Under the
transaction between Parentco and Subco, Parentco has taxable
profits of only $5 and the United States loses the tax revenues
that would result from the extra $20 of profit if the transaction
occurred between two non-affiliated companies in the free
market. Assuming the tax rates in Country Y are lower than
those in the United States, Parentco has decreased its worldwide tax liability.2 4 Parentco has not decreased its overall

involved, because the transfer pricing has implications for the tax
collected in the tax jurisdictions of both of the associated
enterprises involved in a controlled transaction.
Both tax
jurisdictions must accept the same transfer pricing or else the MNE
group will be subject to double taxation.
OECD Discussion Draft, Part II, supranote 11, 124; see OECD Discussion
Draft, Part I, supra note 1, 3.
22 The OECD defines double taxation as "inclusion of the same income
in the tax base by more than one tax administration." OECD Draft Report,
Part II, supra note 11, T 122. Some commentators believe that the
underlying structure of U.S. regulations may lead to double taxation. See,
e.g., Robert G. Clark, Comment, Transfer Pricing, Section 482, and
InternationalTax Conflict: GettingHarmonizedIncome AllocationMeasures
from MultinationalCacophony, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1155, 1196 (1993) (stating
that the 1993 temporary regulations may cause more instances of double
taxation); but see 1993 IRS Tax Enforcement Hearings,supra note 5, at 6-7
(statement of Sen. Byron L. Dorgan) (arguing that billions of dollars fall
through the cracks in the world's tax systems, and, therefore, the United
States should not worry too much about double taxation).
2 OECD Discussion Draft, Part II, supra note 11,
122.
24 There are many more ways for MNEs to establish beneficial transfer
prices, even when subsidiaries are based in tax jurisdictions that have
higher tax rates than the home jurisdiction. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 22,
at 1164-66 (providing other examples of transfer pricing transactions and
defining them as expatriating income, repatriating income, and round-trip
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corporate profitability, however, because Subco resells the
widgets for $30.25 The profits simply have been reallocated
in order to lessen tax obligations."
The two central
questions for taxing authorities are: (1) when to make
transfer pricing adjustments; and (2) how to adjust accurately
transfer prices.
3. TRANSFER PRICING ADJUSTMENT THEORY

Transfer pricing rules may be applied on the basis of two
theoretical foundations: anti-avoidance and basic income
measurement.2
If one views the rules as "anti-avoidance"
rules, then tax authorities will adjust transfer prices only in
cases of abuse.2' This view is popular in many foreign
countries that do not have the administrative capacity to
monitor the accuracy of non-evasive transfer prices.2"
Supporters also believe that the necessity of international
cooperation is decreased under this theory.30
If one views the rules as "basic income measurement" rules,
then adjustments should apply in all cases where transfer
prices deviate from those that would occur in the free

transfers of intangibles); see also Kaplan, supra note 2, at 301-04 (giving a
more detailed example of a transaction similar to the one presented above).
5 This assumes that there were no transportation costs incurred when
moving widgets from the United States to Country Y.
"6 See 59 Fed. Reg. 4791, 4791 (1994) (comments to temporary
regulations on accuracy-related penalties) ("A transfer price will not affect
the total profit ultimately realized by the group but may affect total tax
liability."); see also Kaplan, supra note 2, at 302 ("To be sure, [a company]
wants to minimize its corporate tax burden, but not at the expense of its
corporate profits.").
17 The debate over which theory to use also surfaces in conjunction with
current penalty rules. See Richard J. Wood, Accuracy-Related Penalties: A
Question of Values, 76 IowA L. REv. 309, 321-22 (1991) (discussing the issue
of culpability in evaluating civil tax penalties).
2 See Arnold & McDonnell, supra note 4, at 1379.
, This group includes countries that do not have the resources to meet
the needed burden of proof. See, e.g., Marc M. Levey et al., Section 482
Regs. andItalian TransferPricingRules are Often at Odds, 4 J. INVL TAX'N
456, 457-58 (1993) [hereinafter Levey et al., ItalianRules] (explaining that
the Italian tax authorities have the burden of proof in transfer pricing cases
and that, to date, there have been no transfer pricing cases decided from a
tax perspective).
" See Arnold & McDonnell, supra note 4, at 1387.
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market."1
The United States clearly has adopted this
theory.3 2
Although reliance on the basic income
measurement theory requires a large administrative
commitment, many countries seem to be following the United
States' lead.33
4. DETERMINING THE PROPER ADJUSTMENT
4.1. The Arm's Length Approach
The arm's length approach3 4 seeks to distribute income in
the same way that the market would distribute income; that
is, related parties should earn the same returns that unrelated
parties would earn under the same circumstances.3 5
Recognizing the difficulty of finding identical transactions, the
new regulations concede that "whether a transaction produces
an arm's length result generally will be determined by
reference to the results of comparable transactions under
8' Id. at 1379.
32 See I.R.C. § 482 (1994-95) (allowing the Secretary to make allocations
in order to reflect clearly an enterprise's income); Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(a)(1)
(as amended in 1994) ("The purpose of section 482 is to ensure that
taxpayers clearly reflect income attributable to controlled transactions, and
to prevent the avoidance of taxes with respect to such transactions.").
There does not seem to be, however, international agreement with this
position. See Arnold & McDonnell, supranote 4, at 1379 (noting the lack of
general agreement when international tax experts discussed, among other
things, the policy foundations of transfer pricing at a 1993 transfer pricing
conference in France).
3 See Levey et al., Japan's System, supra note 4, at 413.
4 The 1977 OECD Draft Convention on Double Taxation first referred
to this approach as the "separate enterprise" principle. See ORGANISATION
FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEv. COMM. ON FISCAL AFFAIRS,
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEV., DRAFT DOUBLE
TAXATION CONVENTION ON INCOME AND CAPITAL 12 (1977) [hereinafter
OECD DRAFT CONVENTION]. For further historical analysis of the arm's
length method, see WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 459-61; Clark, supra
note 22, at 1166-68.
" See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1) (as amended in 1994) ("A controlled
transaction meets the arm's length standard if the results of the transaction
are consistent with the results that would have been realized if uncontrolled
taxpayers had engaged in the same transaction under the same
circumstances."); see also WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 483; OECD
Discussion Draft, Part I, supra note 1,
19; Arnold & McDonnell, supra
note 4, at 1379 (defining the goal of the arm's length standard as the
treatment of each individual transaction within a MNE as if it occurred in
the free market between unrelated parties).
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comparable circumstances." s The OECD adopted the "arm's
37
length" standard as a central tenet of its 1979 Report.
Based on that report, the arm's length approach has been
adopted as the international standard.3"
Despite its international acceptance, the arm's length
standard is problematic. In addition to the difficulties
inherent in establishing an arm's length price,39 two main
problems exist. The first is whether application of the
approach requires actual transactions. Not all descriptions of
the method refer to transactions. ° If the arm's length
principle requires actual transactions, the rules will be unable
Although
to account for certain transfers of value.4
transactions can be hypothesized for these transfers of value,
doing so is difficult and subjective, and it increases the risk of
double taxation.4" The second problem results from the
enormous administrative costs and the large amount of time
it takes to determine a correct arm's length price.43
"6Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1) (as amended in 1994).
See 1979 OECD REPORT, supra note 1, at 8-9 (using the arm's length
approach as the foundation for determining the best way to establish
transfer pricing); see also icL at 96 (recommending arm's length pricing as
the goal of transfer pricing adjustments).
" The OECD defines the "arm's length principle" as "the international
37

standard for determining transfer prices for tax purposes

....

"

OECD

Discussion Draft, Part I, supra note 1, Glossary of Terms.
3 The OECD recognizes that "[i]n many cases, there may be a genuine
difficulty in accurately determining [an arm's length] price .... " Id. 1 18.
40 For example, article 9(1) of the OECDDraft Convention states in part:
Where ...

conditions are made or imposed between the two

[associated] enterprises in their commercial or financial relations
which differ from those which would be made between independent
enterprises, then any profits which would, but for those conditions,
have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those
conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of
that enterprise and taxed accordingly.
OECD DRAFT CONVENTION, supra note 34, at 47; see also Arnold &
McDonnell, supra note 4, at 1379 (arguing that article 9(1) does not focus
on an enterprise's transactional revenue and expenses).
41 See Arnold & McDonnell, supra note 4, at 1380.
42 There does not appear to be any international consensus on whether
transactions should be hypothesized. See id.
41 See Roundtable Discussion,supra note 19, at 1121 (noting that one of
the obvious problems with the arm's length system is the amount of
resources devoted to determining a transfer price); see also 1993 IRS Tax
Enforcement Hearings, supra note 5, at 1 (statement of Sen. Byron L.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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The United States has adopted, and continues to favor, the
arm's length approach." The new regulations represent the
U.S. government's continued support for this method, and its
attempt to solve the method's inherent problems in order to
allow for more flexible and efficient determinations of arm's
length prices.4
4.2. The FormularyApportionment Approach4"
Because of the difficulties inherent in the arm's length
approach, some people have advocated the use of the formulary
apportionment approach.4" One U.S. senator described this
approach as "this country's best chance to stop massive tax
avoidance by international firms doing business in the United

Dorgan). Senator Dorgan cited to one case that involved 19 file boxes of
information that took 10 years to produce. The judge needed four years to
review the information and his decision was 240 pages long. Id.
44 See WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 485 (concluding that "[tihe arm's
length standard remains the theoretically preferable approach to income
allocation."); Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1) (as amended in 1994) ("In
determining the true taxable income of a controlled taxpayer, the standard
to be applied in every case is that of a taxpayer dealing at arm's length with
an uncontrolled taxpayer.").
"' In general, commentators believe that the service has allowed for
flexibility: the final regulations offer more guidance and flexibility than the
previous temporary regulations. See Carlson et al., supra note 13; Robert
D. Hershey Jr., U.S. Sets New Tax Rules on Pricing,N.Y. TIMEs, July 5,
1994, at D3.
46 The OECD defines the global formulary apportionment method as
"allocat[ing] the global profits of an MNE group ... on the basis of a
predetermined and mechanistic formula." OECD Discussion Draft, Part I,
supra note 1, 1 180.
" See 1993 IRS Tax Enforcement Hearings,supranote 5, at 3 (statement
of Sen. Byron L. Dorgan) (arguing that the federal government should adopt
a formulary approach similar to the one developed by various states); id. at
79 (testimony of Dan R. Bucks, Executive Director, Multistate Tax
Commission) ("[Ilt is time for the U.S. government, through Treasury, to
lead its trading partners down a new path of dividing profits through
formula apportionment."); id. at 21 (testimony of Philip M. Aldalpe, Division
Manager, Idaho State Tax Commission) (arguing that use of the formula
approach at the federal level would ease compliance and improve equity
among taxpayers); but see 1979 OECD REPORT, supra note 1, at 14
("Proposals for radical reformulations of the approach to intra-group
transfer pricing which would move away from the arm's length approach
towards so-called global or direct methods of profit allocation, or towards
fixing transfer prices by reference to predetermined formulae for allocating
profits between affiliates, are not endorsed in this report.").
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol16/iss2/3
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States."8 This approach applies a predetermined formula to
a MNE's worldwide profits in an attempt to determine the
proper allocation of taxable income.4" The formula uses a
variety of factors, such as property, payroll, and sales, in order
to determine what portion of a MNE's business is based in a
particular jurisdiction.5" Generally, formulary apportionment
is based on the premise that the connected parts of a MNE
work together to generate a common bottom line. 1 Thus, a
MNE should report income in each jurisdiction in proportion
to the business it conducts there.5"
Critics also have questioned this method. The most
significant critique of the formula approach is the arbitrary
nature of predetermined formulas.5" By changing the factors
on which the formula is based, a country can increase its tax
revenue.5 4 A second criticism of the formula method is how
to determine the appropriate pool of profits to be examined.5 5
Theoretically, however, the formula approach offers two
advantages. First, once there is an agreement on the proper
formula and the appropriate profit pool to use, the
administrative and time-related burdens of transfer pricing

""Letter from Senator Byron L. Dorgan to Treasury Secretary Lloyd
Bentsen (Oct. 31, 1994), in 94 TAx NOTES TODAY, Nov. 10, 1994, available
in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File.
4S See Arnold & McDonnell, supra note 4, at 1380.
' See 1993 IRS Tax Enforcement Hearings, supra note 5, at 77
(statement of Dan R. Bucks, Executive Director, Multistate Tax
Commission) (referring to the formulary apportionment methods used by
California, Montana, North Dakota, and Alaska); OECD Discussion Draft,
Part I, supra note 1, 1 180 (stating that "[tihe formula would most likely be
based on some combination of costs, assets, payroll, and sales.").
" See 1993 IRS Tax Enforcement Hearings,supranote 5, at 6 (statement
of Sen. Byron L. Dorgan); OECD Discussion Draft, Part I, supra note 1,

1182.
"2See 1993 IRS Tax Enforcement Hearings,supranote 5, at 6 (statement
of Sen. Byron L. Dorgan).
5 See Arnold & McDonnell, supra note 4, at 1380.
See OECD Discussion Draft, Part I, supra note 1, 186 (stating that
countries may want to emphasize those factors that predominate in their
jurisdictions). For example, a labor-intensive country would want to use
payroll as a factor in the formula. Critics of the method argue that this
action would result in an overallocation of income to labor-intensive
countries. See Arnold & McDonnell, supra note 4, at 1380.
5s See Arnold & McDonnell, supra note 4, at 1380.
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Second, if international
adjustments are minimal.5"
agreement could be reached on the correct formula to use,
double taxation and tax avoidance through transfer pricing
would be minimal.
Despite these potential advantages, the formulary approach
faces many obstacles.57 Perhaps most importantly, the arm's
length approach remains the international standard.5"
Another obstacle is the perception that the necessary
international consensus is impossible to achieve on certain
issues." As a result, as long as the United States continues
to be the leader in establishing transfer pricing rules, and
continues to give primacy to the arm's length approach, the
formulary method will remain subordinate.6"

" See, e.g., 1993 IRS Tax Enforcement Hearings, supra note 5, at 18
(testimony of Dan R. Bucks, Executive Director, Multistate Tax Commission)
(estimating that the federal government spends a minimum of three to
seven times as many staff hours completing a partial international arm's
length audit as compared to the amount of time that some states spend on
a complete international formula apportionment audit).
"' In addition to the problems discussed above, the OECD also criticizes
formulary apportionment for failing to deal with exchange rate movements.
See OECD Discussion Draft, Part I, supra note 1, T 189.
5 See supra note 38; Roundtable Discussion, supra note 19, at 1121
("[P]roponents of the unitary method have not shown.., that the virtues
of unitary systems so outweigh the arm's length system that we should
endure ... international realignment to a different system without any
guarantee that we would ultimately reach the degree of uniformity that we
have today."); cf. Arnold & McDonnell, supra note 4, at 1381 (arguing that,
to an extent, the consensus on the arm's length approach is misguided
because certain methods used in order to determine an arm's length price,
most notably the comparable profits method and the profit splits method,
are formalistic in nature).
""The OECD asserts that the "transition to a global formulary
apportionment system therefore would present enormous political and
administrative complexity and require a level of international cooperation
that is unrealistic to expect in the field of international taxation." OECD
Discussion Draft, Part I, supra note 1, 187; see Arnold & McDonnell, supra
note 4, at 1380. Advocates argue, however, that the unpopularity of the
formulary method is largely a result of political concerns, and that the
international agreements necessary are the same as those needed for
successful use of the arm's length method. See id. at 1381.
" In its Discussion Draft, the OECD explicitly rejected global formulary
apportionment, noting "[tihe OECD Member countries do not accept these
propositions and do not consider global formulary apportionment a realistic
alternative to the arm's length principle. ... " OECD Discussion Draft, Part
I, supra note 1, 9 184.
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5. THE NEW REGULATIONS

The new IRS regulations reaffirm the primacy of the arm's
length approach presented in the 1993 temporary
regulations."' They also signify the IRS's commitment to two
general policy goals. The first is to increase efficiency and
accuracy in establishing transfer prices. The second is to
provide the IRS with additional information to help it make
transfer price adjustments.6 2 Although section 4823 of the
Internal Revenue Code is the central transfer pricing
provision, the temporary regulations promulgated in
conjunction with section 666264 of the Code also attempt to
further these policy goals. In general, section 482 regulations
act as the "carrot" for taxpayers, while section 6662
regulations act as the "stick."6 5 Thus, the two sections and
their regulations must be examined together.
5.1. The Section 482 Regulations
Because section 4826 is such a broad provision, 7 the
*" Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1) (as amended in 1994) ("In
determining the true taxable income of a controlled taxpayer, the standard
to be applied in every case is that of a taxpayer dealing at arm's length with
an uncontrolled taxpayer.") with 58 Fed. Reg. 5263, 5265 (1993) (comments
to temporary regulations) ("The scope and purpose provisions have been
reorganized to make clear that the arm's length standard is the guiding
principle for all allocations under section 482 ....
").
6" See generally WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 462 ("Problems related
to information and aggressive return positions would be alleviated if the
regulations specifically set out a taxpayer's responsibility to document the
methodology used in establishing intercompany transfer prices prior to filing
the tax return and to require that such documentation be provided within
a reasonable time after request.").
63 See I.R.C. § 482 (CCH 1994-95).
64 See I.R.C. § 6662 (1993) (governing accuracy-related penalties).
6" See John Turro, In InternationalArea, Transfer PricingDominated
'94, 95 TAx NOTES TODAY, Jan. 5, 1995, availablein LEXIS, Fedtax Library,
TNT File.
" Section 482, the central statutorybasis for establishing transfer prices,
provides:
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses
... owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests,
the Secretary may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income,
deductions, credits, or allowances between or among such
organizations, trades, or businesses, if he determines that such
distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order to
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regulations aim to establish detailed rules, requirements, and
methods by which transfer prices should be established, while
not reducing the Secretary's power.6" In doing so, these
regulations further the IRS's goal of increased transfer pricing
accuracy.
The new regulations provide six methods for adjusting
prices for transferred tangibles: the comparable uncontrolled
price method ("CUP"),8" the resale price method ("RPM")7
the cost plus method, 1 the comparable profits method
("CPM"), 2 the profit split method,"
and unspecified
prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of
such organizations, trades, or businesses.
In the case of any transfer (or license) of intangible property
...
the income with respect to such transfer or license shall be
commensurate with the income attributable to the intangible.
I.R.C. § 482 (CCH 1994-95).
67 See Kaplan, supra note 2, at 305 ("A more broadly drawn statute is
difficult to imagine.").
68 Recognizing the complex nature of the regulations, the IRS is
expanding the transfer pricing techniques manual for its revenue agents
from six to 70 pages. In conjunction, the IRS is developing a one-week
training course for its agents specifically for transfer pricing issues. See
IRS to Expand TransferPricingGuide for Agents, Examiners, Official Says,
205 Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) § G, Oct. 26, 1993, availablein LEXIS,
Legis Library, DREXEC File.
69 See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(b)(1) (as amended in 1994) ("The comparable
uncontrolled price method evaluates whether the amount charged in a
controlled transaction is arm's length by reference to the amount charged
in a comparable uncontrolled transaction."). An uncontrolled transaction is
one between independent enterprises. See OECD Discussion Draft, Part I,
supra note 1, Glossary of Terms. A controlled transaction is one between
associated companies. Id.
o See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(c)(1) (as amended in 1994) ("The resale price
method evaluates whether the amount charged in a controlled transaction
is arm's length by reference to the gross profit margin realized in
comparable uncontrolled transactions."). Under this method, an arm's
length price is determined "by subtracting the appropriate gross profit from
the applicable resale price for the property involved in the controlled
transaction under review." Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(c)(2)(i) (as amended in
1994).
"' See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(d) (as amended in 1994) ("The cost plus
method evaluates whether the amount charged in a controlled transaction
is arm's length by reference to the gross profit markup realized in
comparable uncontrolled transactions."). Under this method, an arm's
length price is determined "by adding the appropriate gross profit to the
controlled taxpayer's costs of producing the property involved in the
controlled transaction." Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(d)(2)(i) (as amended in 1994).
72 See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5(a) (as amended in 1994) ("The comparable
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methods. 4
Additionally, the regulations provide four
methods for determining the prices for transferred intangibles:
the comparable uncontrolled transactions method ("CUT"), 5
the comparable profits method ("CPM")7 the profit split
method7 , and unspecified methods. 8
This Comment
focuses on how these methods affect the best method rule and
their international repercussions."

profits method evaluates whether the amount charged in a controlled
transaction is arm's length based on objective measures of profitability...
derived from uncontrolled taxpayers that engage in similar business
activities under similar circumstances."). Under this method, an arm's
length price is based on "the amount of operating profit that the tested
party would have earned on related party transactions if its profit level
indicator were equal to that of an uncontrolled comparable ... ." Treas.
Reg. § 1.482-5(b)(1) (as amended in 1994).
"' See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-6(a) (as amended in 1994) ("The profit split
method evaluates whether the allocation of the combined operating profit
or loss attributable to one or more controlled transactions is arm's length by
reference to the relative value of each controlled taxpayer's contribution to
that combined operating profit or loss."). There are two different types of
profit split methods: the comparable profit split and the residual profit
split. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-6(c)(2), (c)(3) (as amended in 1994).
"' See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(e) (as amended in 1994) (stating that
methods not specified "may be used to evaluate whether the amount charged
in a controlled transaction is arm's length"). Although the regulations do
not list any examples of other methods available, one option is the
comparable profit interval method, a method proposed in the short-lived
1992 temporary regulations. See Hannes, Round Three, supra note 13, at
405.
" See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(c) (as amended in 1994) ("The comparable
uncontrolled transaction method evaluates whether the amount charged for
a controlled transfer of intangible property was arm's length by reference
to the amount charged in a comparable uncontrolled transaction.").
78 See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5(a) (as amended in 1994).
" See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-6(a) (as amended in 1994).
78 See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(d) (as amended in 1994) (allowing the use of
non-specified methods).
"' This Comment will not discuss how these methods work or their
respective strengths and weaknesses. For an in-depth analysis of these
methods, see Hannes, Round Three, supra note 13, at 401-10; Marc M.
Levey et al., New 482 Regs. Still Favorthe ComparableProfits Method, 4 J.

INT'L TAX'N, available in WESTLAW, JLR Directory (1993); Clark, supra
note 22, at 1168-76. The new regulations also contain an increased number
of examples applying each of the specified methods. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482
(as amended in 1994).
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5.1.1. The Best Method Rule
The new regulations maintain the primacy of the best
method rule, first promulgated in the 1993 temporary
regulations."0 This rule states that an "arm's length result
of a controlled transaction must be determined under the
method that, under the facts and circumstances, provides the
most reliable measure of an arm's length result.""
Two
primary factors must be analyzed to determine what method
yields the best result: (1) the "degree of comparability between
the controlled transaction (or taxpayer) and any uncontrolled
comparables[; and (2)] the quality of the data and assumptions
used in the analysis." 2
This rule creates two significant complications for MNEs.
First, despite claims to the contrary, 3 in many cases a MNE
will have to perform several separate arm's length evaluations
in order to determine the best method. 4 This evaluation
See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1T(b)(2)(iii)(A) (1993) (stating that the
best method is the one that provides the most "accurate" measure of an
arm's length result). The final regulations modify the best method rule as
described in the temporary regulations by focusing on the method that
provides the most "reliable" measure of arm's length. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.482-1(c) (as amended in 1994). In addition, the final regulations provide
much more detail and guidance for application of the best method rule. See
59 Fed. Reg. 34971, 34976 (1994) (comments to Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c)).
81 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c)(1) (as amended in 1994).
83 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c)(2) (as amended in 1994). The 1993 temporary
regulations provided for additional factors: "the number, magnitude, and
accuracy of the adjustments required to apply each method." Temp. Treas.
Reg. § 1.482-1T(b)(2)(iii)(A) (1993).
8 See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c)(1) (as amended in 1994) ("An arm's length
result may be determined under any method without establishing the
80

inapplicability of another method ... ."); John Turro, Best Method Rule
Does Not Require Proving a Negative, Says IRS Official, 93 TAX NOTES

TODAY, Mar. 10, 1993, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File
(quoting Robert E. Ackerman, director of the IRS Advanced Pricing
Agreement Program, as saying that the best method rule does not require
taxpayers
to prove inapplicability of alternative methods).
84

See Peter A. Glicklich & Seth B. Goldstein, Changes in US Transfer.
PricingRegulations Increase ComplianceBurdens for Multinationalsand Up
the Ante in Transfer-PricingDisputes, 41 CAN. TAX J. 382, 386 (1993)

(noting the best method rule requires an analysis of the required
adjustments under each method, and an analysis of the accuracy of the data
used); Steven P. Hannes, IRS 1994 TransferPricingRules Reward Planning
and Documentation,Increase Penalty Risks, 94 TA NOTES TODAY, Aug. 1,

1994, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File [hereinafter Hannes,
1994 Transfer PricingRules] (stating the statutory exception to the pricing
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process is particularly true when it is not clear which method
is best, and when a MNE worries about being audited. When
it is not clear ex ante which method is best, the selection of a
best method depends, in part, on the comparability of results
from competing methods."5 That is, different methods will
have to be applied and the results compared ex post in order
to determine the best method.
The new regulations increase the importance of the best
method rule by not establishing a hierarchy of methods. The
flexibility provided to taxpayers under the new regulations is
also applied to the IRS when conducting an audit. Thus, this
flexibility is "a two-edged sword." 6 Because of the expense
and time involved with such an evaluation, MNEs will be
subject to a much greater administrative burden.
Second, the best method rule could cause problems for
MNEs that are subject to the transfer pricing rules of other
countries. The 1979 OECD Report clearly established a
preference for use of the CUP method," and many countries
have adopted this preference. 8 A MNE based in one of these
penalties requires the taxpayer to evaluate the potential applicability of
other specified methods).
85 See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c)(2)(iii) (as amended in 1994) ("If the best
method rule does not clearly indicate which method should be selected, an
additional factor that may be taken into account in selecting a method is
whether any of the competing methods produce results that are consistent
with the results obtained from the appropriate application of another
method."); see also Hannes, Round Three, supra note 13, at 416 (stating that
a "taxpayer can defend itself in an audit using a methodology that differs
from that used in preparing its return").
86
David Brunori, Treasury's Crowdus Briefs WTI on Final ransfer
Pricing Regs., 94 TAX NOTES TODAY, Aug. 3, 1994, available in LEXIS,
Fedtax Library, TNT File (quoting Duane Weber, a partner with Baker &
McKenzie, Washington, D.C.); Marlis L. Carson, Practitioners,Regulators
Praise Flexibility in Final Transfer Pricing Regs., 94 TAX NOTES TODAY,
July 14, 1994, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File (quoting
Kenneth Wood, Senior Technical Reviewer in the IRS Office of Associate
Chief Counsel (International)).
87 See 1979 OECD REPORT, supra note 1, at 13; see also Marc M. Levey
et al., U.S. Transfer Pricing Rules Remain at Odds with Their French
Counterparts,4 J. INT'L TAX'N 554, 555-56 (1993) [hereinafter Levey et al.,
French Counterparts] (listing the OECD's hierarchical order of transfer
pricing methods).
8s See Levey et al., ItalianRules, supra note 29, at 457 (stating that the
only transfer pricing method Italy's statutory framework recognizes is the
CUP method); see also WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 521 (stating that
Canadian authorities have expressed a preference for the CUP method);
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countries may need to apply the CUP method, even if it would
not qualify as the "best method" under the IRS regulations. 9
Further problems arise if CPM is the best method, 0 since
many countries do not recognize CPM as an acceptable
transfer pricing method.9 '
Thus, MNEs subject to the
transfer pricing rules of other countries may have to use two
different methods, further increasing administrative costs and
burdens."2

Levey et al., French Counterparts, supra note 87, at 554 (stating that
French courts use the 1979 OECD Report to support their decisions).
" See Levey et al., ItalianRules, supranote 29, at 457-58 (claiming that
because of proof problems facing Italian authorities, the taxpayer may rely
on a transfer price that satisfies Italian requirements, but that does not
meet U.S. standards).
SOOne commentator believes that "[w]hile CPM no longer enjoys the
obvious preferences that it did in the 1993 proposals, it may, as a practical
matter, remain the method of choice of IRS personnel in the field." Hannes,
1994 ransfer PricingRules, supra note 84.

" Unlike the United States, the OECD expresses a clear preference for
transaction based methods over profit methods in determining whether a
transfer price is at arm's length. See OECD Discussion Draft, Part I, supra
note 1, 172. The OECD tactfully stated its concern with the use of CPM
as a transfer pricing methodology in its Discussion Draft. The OECD found
that "[v]ery few countries have much experience in the application of the
comparable profits method and most consider it experimental .... " Id.

1 175. In fact, when a profit method must be used in a case of last resort,
most countries apply the profit split method and not CPM. Id. Second, the
OECD expressed the concern of "[many] countries" that the "safeguards
established for the transaction-based methods may be overlooked in
applying the comparable profits method." Id. 9 176. Finally, the OECD
requested that considerable caution be applied to determine whether CPM
could produce an arm's length answer to a particular transaction. Id. 177;
see also Marc M. Levey & Paul L. Barnicke, New Section 482 Regs. Create
Problems for U.S.-CanadianTransactions,4 J. INT'L TAx'N 379, 381 (1993)

(stating that Revenue Canada does not endorse CPM as an acceptable
method).

Problems can occur even if the country officially recognizes the CPM.
France, for example, recognizes CPM, but only as a secondary method where
no other specific data is available. This approach diverges from "the best
method rule." See Levey et al., French Counterparts,supra note 87, at 555.

Japan has also expressed concern over the new regulation's equal treatment
of CPM. See Kathleen Matthews, Foreign Tax Officials Discuss Final
Transfer PricingRegs., 94 TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 30, 1994, availablein

LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File (reporting that Japan's director of
international examinations for its National Tax Administration urged that
CPM be applied only as a method of last resort).
See M. Woods, British Industry Group Says Transfer PricingPenalty
Regs Should Not Reach Firms That Comply With Home Country Rules, 94
TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 15, 1994, availablein LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT
92
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5.1.2. The Reasonable Method Rule
While changes in transfer pricing rules and increased
cooperation among national authorities continue to diminish
large differences between countries' transfer pricing regimes,
international agreement is far from imminent."3 Because of
the problems that the best method rule can create for MINEs,
the IRS should modify it in cases where the MNE is largely
based in another country. Application of a "reasonable method
rule"94 to the transactions of such a MNE in the United
States will allow the MNE to establish transfer prices more
efficiently without fear of double taxation. The reasonableness
threshold will allow the IRS to protect against abusive transfer
prices. In addition, for MNEs based primarily in the United
States, the government could seek a reciprocal concession from
countries with a hierarchy of methods, allowing the MNE to
use the best method as determined by U.S. regulations. This
increased cooperation would not only ease the administrative
burden on MNEs, but would pave the way for international
agreement on proper transfer pricing methodologies. In
addition, it would make competent authority proceedings more
File (stating that while the new transfer pricing and penalty regulations
could prompt a foreign taxing authority or fisc to accept a taxpayer's
selected methodology, the IRS may reject the method chosen).
" See Kaplan, supra note 2, at 301 ('[T]he vital significance of transfer
pricing will persist until all the nations of the world adopt the same tax
system with no idiosyncratic variations regarding rates, definitions, timing
assumptions, deductions, depreciation allowances, or other components of
the taxable base."); Remarks by IRS Commissioner at InternationalFiscal
Association Meeting, 95 TAX NOTES TODAY, Mar. 3, 1995, available in
LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File ("[Attaining international consensus on
transfer pricing is absolutely essential to appropriate compliance in the
area."); see also Levey et al., Italian Rules, supra note 29, at 462 (warning
that it should not be assumed that adherence to U.S. standards will always
be appropriate in Italy and vice versa).
" See Hannes, Deloitte & Touche, supra note 13 (concurring in general
with use of the "best method rule," but encouraging the IRS to accept use
of a "reasonable method rule" in an audit situation); see also Arnold &
McDonnell, supra note 4, at 1387 (finding a tension between 'the need for
detailed rules on transfer pricing and a commonsense, 'reasonableness'
approach").
The reasonable method rule should not be confused with the penalty
regulations exception for reasonable cause and good faith. See Temp. Treas.
Reg. § 1.6664-4T (as amended in 1994). Under that exception, if a taxpayer
had reasonable cause to believe that the method applied met the best
method criteria, no penalty would be imposed.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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successful because countries would be arguing for the same
standard.
5.2. The New Accuracy-Related Penalty Regulations
Early in 1994, the IRS issued temporary regulations
relating to the imposition of penalties for substantial and gross
valuation misstatements. 5 While the section 482 regulations
focus on improving accuracy, the penalty regulations focus on
increasing information and documentation. The request for
increased documentation was based in large part on the IRS's
experience that "the majority of taxpayers do not provide an
explanation of how their intercompany pricing was
established."" Furthermore, the lack of documentation has
negative effects for both the IRS and the taxpayer because it
increases the time, expense, and controversy involved in
attempting to determine whether established prices are at
arm's length."
Section 6662 of the Internal Revenue Code establishes the
thresholds for all accuracy-related penalties.99 The new
penalty regulations, however, deal exclusively with the two
subsections of section 6662 that involve transfer pricing
section 6662(e) penalties for substantial
adjustments:
valuation misstatements'0° and section 6662(h) penalties for

" See Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6662-5T to 1.6662-6T (as amended in 1994).
These regulations replaced the proposed regulation issued in early 1993.
See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-5, 58 Fed. Reg. 5304, 5306-10 (1993). Like
the new transfer pricing regulations, the temporary penalty regulations
maintain the policy goals of the proposed regulations, but provide for a more
detailed analysis.
" See 59 Fed. Reg. 4791, 4792 (1994) (comments to temporary
regulations) ("[Tihese regulations are designed to encourage taxpayers to
make a serious effort to comply with the arm's length standard, report an
arm's length result on their income tax return, document their transfer
pricing analyses, and provide that documentation to the IRS upon request.").
97 Id. at 4791.
98 See id. at 4792.
9 See I.R.C. § 6662(a) (CCH 1994-95) (providing for a penalty of 20% of
any underpayment of tax if the section's threshold requirements are met).
100 See I.R.C. § 6662(e)(1)
(CCH 1994-95) (defining a substantial
valuation misstatement as one where the transfer price claimed on a return
is 200% or more of the § 482 determination of a transfer price, or the net
§ 482 adjustment exceeds $10 million or 10% of gross receipts).
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gross valuation misstatements.1 "
Section 6662 also
contains an exception for taxpayers who calculate transfer
prices with reasonable cause and good faith.'
The new penalty regulations divide penalties for qualifying
transfer price adjustments into two categories: transactional
penalties'
and net adjustment penalties.'
Thus, it is
possible for a MNE to be penalized multiple times if individual
transactions are underreported, and if the overall net section

482 adjustment does not meet requisite levels.
The new penalty regulations also establish the standards
that must be met before the section 6664(c) reasonable cause
and good faith exception can be satisfied."0 5
The new
101 See I.R.C. § 6662(h) (CCH 1994-95) (defining a gross valuation
misstatement as one in which the price claimed by a taxpayer between
persons described in § 482 is 400% or more of the amount determined to be
the arm's length price, or the net § 482 transfer pricing adjustment exceeds
$20 million or 20% of gross receipts).
102 See I.R.C. § 6662(e)(3)(B)(i) (CCH 1994-95) (excluding from the
threshold determination increases in prices for which the taxpayer acted in
good faith and with reasonable cause); I.R.C. § 6664(c) (CCH 1994-95)
(providing a general reasonable cause and good faith exception).
103 See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-6T(a)(1) (as amended in 1994)
(defining transactional penalties as those penalties imposed "on any
underpayment attributable to a substantial valuation misstatement
pertaining to... a transaction between persons described in section 482").
For purposes of transactional penalties, a substantial valuation
misstatement exists if "the price for any property or services (or for use of
property) claimed on any return is 200 percent or more (or 50 percent or
less) of the amount determined under section 482 to be the correct price."
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-6T(b)(1). A gross valuation misstatement exists
if "the price for any property or services (or for the use of property) claimed
on any return is 400 percent or more (or 25 percent or less) of the amount
determined under section 482 to be the correct price." Temp. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.6662-6T(b)(2) (as amended in 1994).
104 See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-6T(a)(1) (as amended in 1994)
(defining net adjustment penalty as a penalty imposed "on any
underpayment attributable to a substantial valuation misstatement
pertaining to ... a net section 482 transfer price adjustment"). A
substantial valuation misstatement exists if "a net section 482 adjustment
is greater than the lesser of 5 million dollars or ten percent of gross
receipts." Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-6T(c)(2) (as amended in 1994). A
gross valuation misstatement exists if "a net section 482 adjustment is
greater than the lesser of 20 million dollars or twenty percent of gross
receipts." Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-6T(c)(3) (as amended in 1994).
The regulations explicitly state that "[a] taxpayer that does not satisfy
the rules of § 1.6662-6T(d) for a net section 482 adjustment cannot satisfy
the reasonable cause and good faith exception under section 6664(c)." Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4T(d) (as amended in 1994).
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penalty regulations' reasonable cause exception is based on
two factors, one objective and the other subjective.,
If
either of these factors is not met, then the taxpayer cannot use
the exception.
5.2.1. The Documentation Requirement
The objective factor of the reasonable cause exception
focuses on documentation.
A taxpayer meets the
documentation requirement if it maintains sufficient
documentation to establish reasonably "that, given the
available data and the applicable pricing methods, the method
... provided the most accurate measure of an arm's length
result under the principles of the best method rule in
[section] 1.482-1(c)." 10 7
Mere possession
of the
documentation, however, is not enough. The taxpayer must
provide the IRS with the documentation within thirty days of
a request, and the documentation must be in existence when
the return is filed.'
If the taxpayer does not provide the
requisite documentation to the IRS within thirty days of a
request, it appears that the taxpayer will not be able to claim
1

HSee Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-6T(d)(2) (as amended in 1994) ("An
amount is excluded from the calculation of a net section 482 adjustment if
the taxpayer establishes that both the specified method and documentation
requirements of this paragraph ... are met with respect to that amount.").
10 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-6T(d)(2)(iii)(A) (as amended in 1994). One
tax foundation believes that the new regulations "require[] a degree of
taxpayer documentation and cooperation under audit conditions that could
prove counterproductive to American corporate competitiveness." Transfer
PricingPenalty Inconsistent with Competitiveness, Tax FoundationSays, 94
TAX NoTEs TODAY, Sept. 26, 1994, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT
File.
It should be noted that although the temporary regulations preferred
the method that provided the most accurate measure of an arm's length
result, the final § 482 regulations changed the focus from accuracy to
reliability. While the temporary regulations were modified in July 1994 to
make the language consistent with the final § 482 regulations, this provision
was not changed. This oversight is most likely a drafting error, and the
taxpayer should expect to meet the documentation requirement if its
documentation establishes its chosen method as the most reliable one.
"08 See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-6T(d)(2)(iii)(A) (as amended in 1994).
This 30-day requirement has been criticized. See Stephen J. Salvati, AT&T
Objects to Document-ProductionRequirement, 94 TAX NoTEs TODAY, Aug.
31, 1994, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File (claiming that the
30-day requirement is too stringent for background documentation that is
often widely disbursed and cumbersome to collect).
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the reasonable cause exception."
5.2.2. The Specified Method Requirement
The subjective element of the reasonable cause test is the
specified method requirement. The test is met "ifthe taxpayer
selects and applies a specified method in a reasonable
manner."" 0 The taxpayer's selection and application of a
specific method is reasonable "only if ...

the taxpayer

reasonably concluded that the method.., provided the most
reliable measure of an arm's length result under the principles
of the best method rule.""'
Ultimately, however, the
taxpayer's decisions will be reasonable only if "it has made a
reasonable effort to evaluate the potential applicability of the
other specified methods in a manner consistent with the
principles of the best method rule.""2
The 1993 proposed regulations explicitly established a presumption
that the taxpayer did not use a reasonable effort to determine tax liability
if the requisite documentation was not provided to the IRS within 30 days
of its request. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-5(j)(5)(ii), 58 Fed. Reg. 5304,
5308 (1993). The stringent nature of this requirement was strongly
condemned. See William L. Raby & Burgess J. Raby, Raby & Son Find
Fault with Proposed Transfer PricingPenalty Regs., 93 TAX NOTES TODAY,
Mar. 3, 1993, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File ("[I]t is one
thing for the IRS to instruct its agents to consider that 30 days is
reasonable and to presume that the documentation doesn't exist if it isn't
produced in that time. It is quite another matter to put such a rule into the
regulations with the apparent intent of affecting what a court will consider
as admissible evidence on the issue of reasonable cause and good faith.").
It is not clear, however, whether by removing the explicit presumption, the
temporary regulations have eased the requirement.
110 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-6T(d)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1994).
m Id. § 1.6662-6T(d)(2)(ii).
2 Id. § 1.6662-6T(d)(2)(ii).
The International Chamber of Commerce
criticized the regulations' "reasonableness" standard, arguing that "Ithe
[tiemporary [riegulations as drafted appear to enhance rather than limit the
opportunity for the arbitrary application of penalties." David Swaine, ICC
Criticizes Transfer PricingPenalty Regs., 94 TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct. 20,
1994, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File. One attorney
concluded that in order to avoid penalties a taxpayer would not only have
to show how the best method was selected, but also show why other possible
methods were rejected. See Carlson et al., supra note 13.
Despite these criticisms, the temporary regulations' specified method
requirement is an improvement over the 1993 proposed regulations'
reasonable belief requirement, which was based on whether the taxpayer
"reasonably believed that the result would more likely than not be sustained
on its merits." Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-5(j)(5)(iii)(A), 58 Fed. Reg. 5304,
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The temporary regulations list five factors that are relevant
to the determination of reasonableness."'
As currently
drafted, two of these factors are problematic.
One
controversial factor is the experience and knowledge of the
taxpayer, including all members of the taxpayer's controlled
group114

This

section

imputes

the

knowledge

and

experience of the entire controlled group to the specific
taxpayer. Thus, "all members of a controlled group are
essentially held to the highest standard applicable to any
member of the group," even if it is impractical for the specific
taxpayer to make use of the entire group's experience or
knowledge. 5 A second troublesome .factor is whether or not
the taxpayer used the most current reliable data. 6 This
factor is problematic because it views the data available to the
taxpayer at the time of filing, and not at the time that the
transfer price was established. One noted tax expert asserted
that as a practical matter, compliance with this provision may
be impossible because "taxpayers cannot instantly change the
results by flicking a computer switch," when new information
becomes available." 7 Another tax expert testified that the
provision is "bad for self-assessment and voluntary
compliance."1
In addition, this provision may also violate

5309 (1993) (emphasis added). This standard was severely criticized by tax
analysts as being too strict. See Hannes, Deloitte & Touche, supra note 13
(claiming that the "more likely than not" standard is unrealistic because
there is often disagreement about facts and their significance in transfer
pricing situations); Hannes, Round Three, supra note 13, at 416 (arguing
that this standard, which requires a greater than 50% chance of success, is
high for fact-sensitive tax issues, especially in the area of transfer pricing);
Raby & Raby, supra note 109 (stating that "it requires a feat of mental
legerdemain that is beyond us" to find congressional intent to put "More
likely than not" into the determination of reasonable cause and good faith).
113
See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-6T(d)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1994).
.14 See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-6T(d)(2)(ii)(A) (as amended in 1994).
"' Linda B. Burke, TEI Outlines Comments on Transfer PricingPenalty
Regs., 94 TAx NOTES TODAY, Sept. 1, 1994, available in LEXIS, Fedtax
Library, TNT File (criticizing this standard as "unduly harsh").
1 See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-6T(d)(2)(ii)(B) (as amended in 1994).
'
IRS, Unofficial Transcript of IRS Hearing on Transfer PricingRegs,
94 TAx NoTEs TODAY 188-11, Sept. 23, 1994, available in LEXIS, Fedtax
Library, TNT File (testimony of Philip Bergquist, Senior Tax Counsel for
Apple Computer and Chair of the International Tax Committee for Tax
Executives
Institute).
" 8 Id. (testimony of Raymond J. Wiacek, attorney at Jones, Day, Reavis
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some countries' accounting principles."'
Congress, however, has supported the IRS's emphasis on
increased documentation and penalty application. In the 1993
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, Congress lowered the
thresholds for imposition of the accuracy-related penalties. 20
In addition, in response to assertions that the IRS would have
discretion in applying the penalties,' 2 ' counsel for the House
Ways and Means Committee stated that Congress did not
intend to allow discretion in applying transfer pricing
penalties."
The 1993 Act also incorporated some of the documentation
requirements. Under the section 6662 amendments, section
482 adjustments that create net increases in taxable income
are disregarded only if the taxpayer: (1) establishes that the
price it used was determined under a viable section 482
method; (2) has contemporaneous documentation that sets
forth the reasonableness of a determination of a transfer price;
and (3) provides such documentation to the Secretary within
thirty days of a request."
The amended section also
provides that the determination of reasonable cause and good
faith will be based on factors included in the regulations." 4
& Pogue, Washington, D.C.).
119 See Matthews, supra note 91 (statement by Dieter Eimermann,
Attache for Tax Affairs, Germany).
12 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66,
§ 13236, 107 Stat. 312, 505 (1993) (lowering the threshold for a substantial
valuation misstatement from $10 million to the lesser of $5 million or 10%
of the gross valuation).
121 See Official Says Section 6662 Penalties Unlikely in Cases with GoodFaith Efforts, 191 Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) § G, Oct. 5, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Legis Library, DREXEC File (reporting that the
Treasury Department's deputy international tax counsel stated that IRS
agents would retain discretion over penalties).
122 See H.R. 2264, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 720 (1993) ("The committee does
not believe that a section 482 adjustment that exceeds the threshold
generally should escape the penalty unless the taxpayer can show that the
return position was arrived at after bestowing a reasonable amount of
attention to the issue."); Section 6662 Penalties 'Not a BargainingChip,'
Ways and Means PanelAideSays, 215 Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) § G,
Nov. 9, 1993, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, DREXEC File (quoting
Assistant Counsel, House Ways and Means Oversight Subcommittee:
"'Congress expects this penalty will be asserted and collected where it is
warranted'").
'23 See I.R.C. § 6662(e)(3)(B)(i) (CCH 1994-95).
124

See I.R.C. § 6662(e)(3)(D) (CCH 1994-95).
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Both Congress and the IRS view section 6662 penalties and
regulations as central to increased compliance with section 482
and its regulations.'2 5 The emphasis on documentation is
reasonable and beneficial both to the IRS and to taxpayers.
Because of the fact-specific nature of, and degree of complexity
in, transfer pricing proceedings, however, the reasonableness
of the documentation and specified method requirements will
depend on how the IRS chooses to enforce the provisions. In
conjunction with the recently lowered penalty thresholds,
strict enforcement by the IRS may lead to a tremendous
increase in transfer pricing penalties.' 2 6
These changes cast doubt on the justification for the
penalty provisions. Ostensibly, both Congress and the IRS
view the penalty provisions as a means of discouraging
transfer pricing abuses and encouraging increased compliance
through increased documentation. 2 ' Many commentators
argue, however, that transfer pricing penalties should only be
applied in cases of wrongful intent or abuse, 2 ' and should
not be applied in cases where voluntary compliance will not be
enhanced.'2 9 Because of the complexity of initial transfer
pricing determinations and the increased scope of the penalty
provisions, taxpayers who attempt to report correct arm's
length prices may be penalized. An increase in the penalties
will not increase voluntary compliance because the reported
prices were mistaken calculations, not intentional
125 This view was based in part on the belief that "current law is
deficient." H.R. 2264, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 719 (1993).
126 Many countries fear that this increase has already begun.
See
,Michiyo Nakamoto, Nissan Pays Y17bn in US Penalty Taxes: Concern Over
Moves Against Multinationals, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1993, at 6 (noting a
recent Nissan settlement with the IRS over penalty taxes, and the growing
concern that the United States is tightening its transfer pricing review).
127 See Wood, supra note 27, at 318 (arguing that compliance should be
the central policy goal of any tax penalty). The OECD also takes this
position. See OECD Discussion Draft, Part II, supra note 11, 1 134.
Despite intonations from critics, there is no support for the view that the
penalty provisions have been changed for revenue-raising purposes.
121 See John Turro, Officials, Witnesses Debate ProposedTransferPricing
Penalty Regs at IRS Hearing,93 TAx NOTES TODAY, May 17, 1993, available
in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File (citing attorney Leonard Terr as
arguing that it is inappropriate to impose penalties in the absence of bad
intent).
12 See Wood, supra note 27, at 320 ("[Nloncompliant taxpayers should
be subject to penalty only if it would enhance compliance.").
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misrepresentations. In such a situation, the theoretical
underpinnings of the penalty provisions are highly
questionable.
The strict nature of the penalty regulations also engenders
some international concern. Many foreign critics believe that
in order to avoid the U.S. penalty provisions, MNEs will
overallocate income to the United States. 3 0 Although the
fear of double taxation will temper a MNE's desire to
overallocate income to one jurisdiction, other countries may
enact similar penalty provisions to counteract the perceived
overallocation of income to the United States.' 3 '
6. SAFE HARBORS

The interests of taxpayers are greatly affected by the new
regulations. One European-based MNE estimated that it will
need to spend nearly $1 million in order to properly document
its transfer pricing methodology.'
The increased financial
and administrative burdens facing MNEs have led to demands
for increased protections, mostly in the form of safe harbors,
from the strict regulatory requirements.'
Unfortunately,
the IRS has consistently opposed safe harbors,134 and, not
See OECD Discussion Draft, Part II, supra note 11, 141 ("Because
cross-border transfer pricing issues implicate the tax base of two
jurisdictions, an overly harsh penalty system in one jurisdiction may give
taxpayers an incentive to overstate taxable income in that jurisdiction. If
this were to happen, the penalty system would have failed in its primary
130

objective to promote compliance ....

").

See Matthews, supra note 91 (reporting that Paul Dick, Canada's
Chief of International Taxation and Market Analysis, believes that countries
around the world may be forced to match the U.S. penalty provisions to
counteract the incentive of MNEs to overcomply with U.S. rules).
"3See Transfer Pricing: Setting and Recording Royalty Rates, FIN. &
TREASURY, Nov. 1, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, BUSIMR File.
13 This demand is not, however, a recent phenomenon.
See WHITE
PAPER, supra note 12, at 461 (noting that taxpayer calls for safe havens
were present as early as 1965 and 1966). In its discussion regarding safe
harbors, the White Paper noted that they were one of the most common
suggestions for solving the uncertainty in establishing transfer prices. See
id. at 481.
13 See id. at 482 (concluding that safe harbors have historically resulted
in gains to taxpayers without benefits to the government). This conclusion
is based primarily on the White Paper'sthree basic assumptions about safe
harbors: (1) the one common element among safe harbors is that they only
serve to reduce tax liability; (2) the only benefit to the Service is a saving
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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surprisingly, the 1994 regulations are notable for providing no
3 5
safe harbors."
Safe harbors generally are divided into two categories:
absolute... and presumptive.3 7
In order to clarify the
different proposals, this Comment further distinguishes
between negative and positive absolute safe harbors. Most of
the recently proposed safe harbors can be categorized as
negative or presumptive.' 8
This Comment proposes a

of administrative costs; and (3) adjustments or corrections to safe harbor
standards are difficult because of the lack of reliable data and the
complexity of the regulatory process. See id. at 481. See generally OECD
Discussion Draft, Part II, supra note 11, 11 213-230 (discussing general
problems presented by safe harbors).
" The 1993 temporary regulations did contain a small taxpayer safe
harbor. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-iT(f)(1) (1993). The applicability of
that safe harbor was very limited. See Hannes, Round Three, supra note 13,
at 415 (arguing that the safe harbor will only apply to a few taxpayers);
Marc M. Levey, New Section 482 Regs. Warn Taxpayers to Start Gathering
The Data, 4 J. INT'L TAX'N 148, 152 (Apr. 1993), available in LEXIS, Fedtax
Library, JITAX File (arguing that income limits make the safe harbor
undesirable for most taxpayers). In addition, the temporary regulations'
safe harbor had stringent requirements that diminished its usefulness. See
id. (arguing that "the potential downside risk may be too great to warrant
election").
The IRS listed three reasons for not including the safe harbor in the
1994 final regulations. See 59 Fed. Reg. 34971, 34981 (1994) (comments to
final regulations). The IRS believes that the concerns regarding the
compliance burdens of small taxpayers were ameliorated by the factors
promulgated under the regulations under § 6662(e). Id.
Not all
commentators agree. See Hannes, 1994 TransferPricingRules, supra note
84 ("Small companies will be disappointed that a long-awaited safe harbor
has been abandoned. Because of the rigors of the new provisions, small
companies may be big losers under the regulations.").
138 See WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 481 (defining an absolute safe
harbor as one that "grant[s] the taxpayer total freedom from a section 482
adjustment").
137 Presumptive safe harbors are essentially conditional safe harbors.
See id. (defining a conditional safe harbor as one "that produce[s] a
rebuttable presumption or a shift in the burden of proof in the taxpayer's
favor"). Since all safe harbors are in some sense "conditional," the term
"presumptive" has been adopted to distinguish conditional safe harbors from
absolute safe harbors.
3 To some extent, Advanced Pricing Agreements ("APA") are similar to
positive safe harbors. Under the IRS's APA program, MNEs prospectively
work with the IRS in order to establish an appropriate transfer pricing
methodology and the expected range of prices. See Rev. Rul. 91-22, 1991-1
C.B. 526; Michael Abrutyn et al., Advance PricingAgreements Provide a
Safe Harbor, 2 J. INT'L TAX'N 5 (1991) (listing the intended results of an
APA). The IRS is assured of a certain transfer price range, and the MNE
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positive safe harbor in order to best meet the needs of both the
IRS and the taxpayer.
6.1. Presumptive Safe Harbors
Presumptive safe harbors do not offer absolute protection,
but merely assure the taxpayer of certain advantages if the
requisite criteria are met. Presumptive safe harbors differ
from absolute safe harbors in that they apply to a larger group
of taxpayers and usually offer only limited protection against
specific requirements. They attempt to create consistency in
compliance by limiting uncertainty for qualifying taxpayers.
For example, one common proposal would create a rebuttable
presumption that the taxpayer used the best method available
when its results equal or exceed published profit level
indicators."'
Another proposal would create a higher
burden of proof for the IRS if the taxpayer's results fall within
certain ranges. 40 The U.S. government has traditionally
opposed presumptive safe harbors, insisting that because
taxpayers usually possess the relevant facts, shifting the
burden to the government would be unworkable. 4 '

knows it will not be audited. APAs, however, are distinguishable from the
positive safe harbor proposed by this Comment. See infra Section 6.3.
First, APAs are usually multinational actions that cause delays and favor
foreign-based MNEs. See Abrutyn, supra, at 12. Second, the APA process
is extremely costly. See Large Companies Reconsidering Opposition to
APAs, PractitionersSay, 185 Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) § J, Sept. 27,
1993, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, DREXEC File ("The perception
that APAs are extremely costly has been perpetuated by reports that some
have cost more than $2 million in attorney and economist fees . .

").

Third, the program is not practical for the largest MNEs. See id. (quoting
Mark Beams, Tax Counsel-International for General Electric as saying that
APAs could never be their main vehicle of transfer pricing compliance).
Finally, because MNEs that have had difficult audits or who have
contentious transfer prices usually seek APAs, the IRS never receives
information from the MNEs doing the best job. See id. (arguing that
companies with historically smooth audits do not apply for APAs).
39 See id.
140

See id.

See WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 482.
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6.2. Absolute Safe Harbors
6.2.1. Negative Safe Harbors
Negative safe harbors focus primarily on the taxpayer's
inability to conform adequately to current transfer pricing
requirements. They essentially seek to protect the taxpayer
from the full scope of applicable section 482 rules because of
the belief that forcing compliance would place an onerous
burden on the taxpayer or would not be a cost-effective use of
the IRS's limited resources.'" Thus, most advocates have
focused on the safe harbor as a means to reduce transaction
costs and risks. 4 3 One recent proposal seeks to accomplish
this goal by eliminating the dollar limits in the temporary
regulations and encouraging the IRS to focus not only on the
overall size of the company, but also on the amount of relatedlimits for
when determining
party transactions
Essentially, this proposal encourages the
applicability.'"
IRS to make safe harbor determinations, within a certain
range, on a case-by-case basis.
6.2.2. Positive Safe Harbors
Positive safe harbors differ from negative safe harbors in
that they focus on what a MNE can do, and not on what it
cannot do. That is, positive safe harbors focus on the ability

142 For an example of a negative safe harbor in which compliance would

place too much of a burden on the taxpayer, see Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.4821T(f) (1993). Although not incorporated into the final regulations, many
See Nathan Boidman,
foreign analysts applauded the safe harbor.
Canadian Perspective on 1993 U.S. Transfer Pricing Proposals, 22 TAX
MGMT. INT'L J. 201, 204 (1993) ("Canadians will welcome the safe harbour
election available to small companies, which are not in a position or lack the
resources to avoid the oft messy, time-consuming and costly process of
transfer price disputes . . ").
An example of a negative safe harbor in which the returns on the IRS's
administrative expenditures are not cost effective is the insubstantial tax
benefit safe harbor. This proposed safe harbor would be available if the tax
rate in a foreign jurisdiction was at least 90% of the U.S. rate. But see
WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 482 (rejecting this safe harbor because §
482 adjustments are not dependent on an intent to avoid taxes, and noting
that as a practical matter, adjustments between U.S.-based MNEs and their
affiliates in jurisdictions with similar tax rates rarely take place).
14 See Hannes, Deloitte & Touche, supra note 13.
144 See id.
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of a MNE to adequately conform to current transfer pricing
requirements, not on its inability to do so. As a result, while
negative safe harbors usually apply to smaller companies or
MNEs with a small amount of related-party transfers, positive
safe harbors tend to focus on large MNEs and companies with
a great deal of related-party transfers. Because the potential
for revenue loss is greater with large MNEs, these safe
harbors must be narrowly tailored, and must begin with an
inquiry into the benefit that the government will derive from
the safe harbor.
Two of the central themes of the new regulations are the
desire for more information and documentation and the
concomitant desire to ease the administrative burden and
conflict between tax authorities and MNEs.1 45
All safe
harbors benefit the government by decreasing the
administrative burden of addressing numerous insignificant
cases.14 A positive safe harbor seeks to provide additional
benefits to the government, such as supplying the IRS with
information and documentation. In light of the IRS's current
policy goals, a positive safe harbor based on an exchange of
information and documentation is necessary. Under an
informational positive safe harbor, specific MNEs can avoid
transfer pricing reallocations if they satisfy certain criteria, in
exchange for the release of certain information to the IRS.
While this provision may appear duplicative of the existing
informational requirements in the new regulations, the safe
harbor offers more advantages to the government.
First, many of the new regulations' documentation
requirements are designed for the protection of the MNE and
for the ease of the IRS in the event of an audit. Absent a

"4 See supra Section 5 and accompanying notes.
The IRS's interest in easing its administrative burden is, in fact, the
central and perhaps only goal of both negative and presumptive safe
harbors. The White Paper defines the perfect safe harbor as one that "would
result in the elimination of all insignificant cases and the selection of cases
for detailed analysis by taxpayers and further examination by the Service
that would more likely produce sustainable, significant adjustments if
analyzed incorrectly by the taxpayer." WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 481;
see also OECD Discussion Draft, Part II, supra note 11, 1 212. Easing the
administrative burden is also the central goal of APAs. See supra note 131
and accompanying text. In a world of unlimited governmental resources,
these safe harbors would probably not exist because there would be no
benefit to the government.
146
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costly and time-consuming audit, however, the gathered
information remains with the MNE, and does not benefit the
government in any way. This safe harbor will enable the
government to access specific information from a wide range
of MNEs without having to conduct an audit. Second, this safe
harbor is a unilateral protection, and is therefore not subject
to the influence of any foreign authority. Third, the IRS will
be able to reallocate administrative resources to other transfer
pricing adjustments.
In order to protect against abuse, the IRS could allow
application of the safe harbor only to a MNE with some
incentive to report correctly or to a MNE with past evidence of
correct reporting. For example, the IRS could limit the safe
harbor to those MNEs that have traditionally reported
accurate transfer prices, 4 ' to those MNEs with substantial
business in other countries with strong transfer pricing
laws,"' or to those MNEs that . do substantial business in
jurisdictions with higher tax rates.'49 In addition, the IRS
could specify the type of information that the MNE must
submit and for how long. Finally, a safe harbor could include
an abuse clause that would allow readjustment if the IRS
determined that the prices constituted a gross valuation
misstatement. 50
This safe harbor would also be advantageous for the MNE.
In the short run, it allows the MNE to establish transfer prices
without the worry of reallocation. In light of the long and
complicated nature of transfer pricing adjustments, this
benefit cannot be underestimated.
In addition, the
information provided need not be more than would necessarily
be required in an audit, and it may be less. If the IRS
requests specific information, the MNE need only worry about
documenting and providing that information. In fact, much of
the data is already required under the new penalty
For example, the IRS may determine that four years of correct
reporting indicates the MNE's understanding of the requirements and its
147

willingness to comply.

14" Essentially, the IRS could rely on foreign countries' audit programs
or transfer pricing regulations to assure that the MNE is not reporting
abusive transfer prices.
14 Again, the IRS could rely on foreign taxing authorities to detect
transfer pricing abuse because any misreporting would be in the IRS's favor.
1'0 See I.R.C. § 6662(h) (1993).
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regulations. Thus, a MNE prepared to take advantage of this
informational safe harbor will not need to increase its
expenditures and still will receive valuable assurances.
In the long run, the MNE will benefit because the IRS will
use the information that it gathers to promulgate transfer
pricing methodologies that clearly reflect proper jurisdictional
taxable income.
This information also will allow for
prospective proper income allocation, thereby decreasing the
worry of double taxation. Ideally, this informational safe
harbor will allow the IRS and MNEs to enter the 21st century
seeking an international agreement on transfer pricing
methodologies, based not on conjecture and theory, but rather
on information and experience.
7. CONCLUSION

The international importance of transfer pricing is
increasing every year. As the economies of the world become
increasingly integrated, countries are becoming more
concerned with protecting national
tax revenues.
Unfortunately, transfer pricing methodologies lag behind.
There is currently not enough information about different
transfer pricing methodologies to settle the increasing debate
about proper methodologies.
This Comment, therefore,
proposes an informational positive safe harbor that will allow
the IRS to gather vital information, while reducing the heavy
burden placed on MNEs by the new regulations.
The United States continues to lead the transfer pricing
parade. The regulations promulgated by the IRS in 1994
signify this leadership and the continued attempt to establish
proper transfer pricing methodologies under the arm's length
method. By increasing the applicability of the penalty
provisions and the burdens on MNEs, the U.S. government
also demonstrates its desire to crack down on transfer pricing
abuses.'
In order to avoid an increase in international tax
conflicts, however, this Comment advocates modifications of
the regulations.

"5,President Clinton's call for an additional 235 agents specifically to
review transfer prices represents a more explicit example of this intention
to reduce transfer pricing abuses. See Levey et al., Japan'sSystem, supra
note 4, at 413.
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First, the "best method rule" is conceptually a step in the
right direction. In cases where foreign jurisdictions have
prioritized transfer pricing methodologies, however, allowances
should be made for the use of reasonable foreign methods.
Second, the temporary penalty regulations' reasonable cause
and good faith standards require alteration. While decreased
penalty thresholds and increased documentation requirements
will enhance voluntary compliance, the narrow exceptions will
not necessarily do the same. Penalty provisions that fail to
enhance compliance and that threaten to become revenue
raising procedures are not consistent with traditional
theoretical goals of encouraging correct income allocation.
Through the use of this Comment's recommendation of a
positive safe harbor and the modified new regulations, the IRS
will be better equipped to compile vital information regarding
transfer pricing. This information will allow the IRS to
establish the best methodologies for establishing transfer
prices, and will allow the United States to continue its
leadership in the field of transfer pricing into the 21st century.
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